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[Editor’s Note: Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to present the following guest blog post by
MAJ Chris Telley, U.S. Army, assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School, addressing how
Artificial Intelligence (AI) must be understood as an Information Operations (IO) tool if U.S.
defense professionals are to develop effective countermeasures and ensure our resilience
to its employment by potential adversaries.]
AI-enabled IO present a more pressing
strategic threat than the physical hazards of
slaughter-bots or even algorithmically-
escalated nuclear war. IO are efforts to
“influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the
decision-making of adversaries and potential
adversaries;” here, we’re talking about using AI
to do so. AI-guided IO tools can empathize with
an audience to say anything, in any way needed,
to change the perceptions that drive those
physical weapons. Future IO systems will be able to individually monitor and affect tens of
thousands of people at once. Defense professionals must understand the fundamental
influence potential of these technologies if they are to drive security institutions to counter
malign AI use in the information environment.
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Programmatic marketing, using consumer’s data habits to drive real time automated bidding
on personalized advertising, has been used for a few years now. Cambridge Analytica’s
Facebook targeting made international headlines using similar techniques, but digital
electioneering is just the tip of the iceberg.
An AI trained with data from users’ social
media accounts, economic media
interactions (Uber, Applepay, etc.), and
their devices’ positional data can infer
predictive knowledge of its targets. With
that knowledge, emerging tools — like
Replika — can truly befriend a person,
allowing it to train that individual, for good
or ill.
Substantive feedback is required to
train an individual’s response; humans
tend to respond best to content and
feedback with which they agree. That
content can be algorithmically mass
produced. For years, Narrative Science
tools have helped writers create sports
stories and stock summaries, but it’s just
as easy to use them to create
disinformation. That’s just text, though;
today, the AI can create fake video. A recent warning, ostensibly from former President
Obama, provides an entertaining yet frightening demonstration of how Deepfakes will
challenge our presumptions about truth in the coming years. The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is funding a project this summer to determine whether
AI-generated Deepfakes will become impossible to distinguish from the real thing, even using
other AI systems.
Given that malign actors can now employ AI
to lie “at machine speed,” they still have to get
the story to an audience. Russian bot armies
continue to make headlines doing this very
thing. The New York Times maintains about a
dozen Twitter feeds and produces around 300
tweets a day, but Russia’s Internet Research
Agency (IRA) regularly puts out 25,000 tweets
in the same twenty-four hours. The IRA’s
bots are really just low-tech curators; they
collect, interpret, and display desired information to promote the Kremlin’s narratives.
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Next-generation bot armies will employ far faster computing techniques and profit from an
order of magnitude greater network speed when 5G services are fielded. If “Repetition is a
key tenet of IO execution,” then this machine gun-like ability to fire information at an
audience will, with empathetic precision
and custom content, provide the means
to change a decisive audience’s very
reality. No breakthrough science is
needed, no bureaucratic project office
required. These pieces are already there,
waiting for an adversary to put them
together.
The DoD is looking at AI but remains
focused on image classification and
swarming quadcopters while ignoring the
convergent possibilities of predictive
audience understanding, tailored content
production, and massive scale
dissemination. What little digital IO we’ve
done, sometimes called social media
“WebOps,” has been contractor heavy and
prone to naïve missteps. However, groups
like USSOCOM’s SOFWERX and the students at the Naval Postgraduate School are
advancing the state of our art. At NPS, future
senior leaders are working on AI, now. A half-
dozen of the school’s departments have stood up
classes and events specifically aimed at
operationalizing advanced computing. The
young defense professionals currently working on
AI should grapple with emerging influence tools
and form the foundation of the DoD’s future
institutional capabilities.
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